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The Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative 
 
The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has commissioned the 
Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS) at Bradford University to 
carry out research to promote understanding of how and when poverty and 
vulnerability is exacerbated by armed violence. This study programme, which forms 
one element in a broader “Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative”, aims to provide 
the full documentation of that correlation which DFID feels is widely accepted but not 
confirmed. It also aims to analyse the processes through which such impacts occur 
and the circumstances which exacerbate or moderate them. In addition it has a 
practical policy-oriented purpose and concludes with programming and policy 
recommendations to donor government agencies. 
 
This report on Nairobi is one of 13 case studies (all of the case studies are available at 
www.bradford.ac.uk/cics). This research draws upon secondary data sources 
including existing research studies, reports and evaluations. The analysis and opinions 
expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the 
views or policy of DFID or the UK government. 
 
 
The country reports were:  
Algeria (Meredeth Turshen) 
Chechnya (Hooman Peimani) 
El Salvador (Mo Hume) 
Nairobi, Kenya (Musambayi Katamunga and Lionel Clife) 
Nepal (David Seddon) 
Nigeria (Jeremy Ginifer and Olawale Ismail) 
Northeast India (Mandy Turner and Binalakshmi Nepram) 
Northern Kenya (Margie Buchanan-Smith and Jeremy Lind)  
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Lydia Richardson and Adele Kirsten)  
Sierra Leone (Jeremy Ginifer)  
Somalia (Lionel Cliffe) 
Southern Sudan (Margie Buchanan-Smith and Regina Burns Mackenzie) 
 
Extra research was provided by June Rock and Thom Oommen.  
 
 
All of these reports are available at www.bradford.ac.uk/cics
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Executive summary 
 
The capital city of Kenya, Nairobi, was selected for research as it experiences high 
levels of crime, even compared with most African cities of comparable size, and 
relatively a higher proportion of these crimes are ‘violent’. At one level or other, 
much of this criminal violence can be said to be ‘organised’, and one vector of the 
violence is contestation between gangs. There is also a widespread climate of fear that 
results. At a macro-level the violent organised criminality has come to be perceived as 
posing a threat to the overall national economy, as well as affecting the livelihoods 
and well-being of city residents themselves. 
 
The context of armed violence 
 
As with other cities studied, the sources of armed violence owe much to its origins 
and its geography. Established only 100 years ago, for most of its life it was planned 
to provide homes and services for the colonial settlers brought in by the British 
colonial rulers. As well as commercial and industrial areas, it spawned affluent and 
dispersed residential suburbs reaching into the mountains to the north and west. No 
estates were specifically provided for African town dwellers until 1950. They tended 
to congregate in unofficial ‘squatter’ slums, with no property or other rights and 
subject to periodic bulldozing. This pattern was altered only to the extent that the new 
African business and political elites gravitated to the middle class, formerly 
exclusively white, suburbs and way of life. Slums abounded, being more or less 
tolerated though still occasionally bulldozed, as the city trebled in size from 1 million 
in 1970.  
 
The resulting geographical pattern today is one of slightly denser affluent suburbs 
with very much inferior estates and vast slums, some adjacent to the suburbs but most 
in distant parts of a dispersed city. These latter areas now house 2 of the 3 million 
people and are marginalised and feel politically and economically excluded. This 
exclusion has intensified in recent years as a result of earlier expansion of education, 
so that 300,000 primary school leavers and 190,000 secondary descend on the labour 
market annually. But jobs are almost non-existent as a result of a decade-long 
observation of prescriptions by international financial institutions, with the resulting 
decrease in wages, disinvestment and further impoverishment. 
 
In the last decade the pattern of armed violence has evolved in a variety of ways: 
• Criminal acts are no longer typically perpetrated by individuals and small 
groups but by or under the banner of organised gangs, typically with links to 
groups in business and/or politics. 
• Crime is becoming increasingly violent: not just more crimes against the 
person but robberies, car-jacking etc becoming more often accompanied by 
physical harm. 
• It is carried out with a new degree of impunity, an indifference to hurting 
people or to the prospects of being held to account – a result, in turn, of the 
corruption in the police and security services and the judiciary. 
 
The major gangs are often based on one slum area or ‘location’. Their names are 
evocative: ‘Taliban’, ‘Army of Embakasi’ (or other name of other suburb), the Boys 
of Baghdad. The most notorious and extensive, mungiki (‘masses’ in the Kikuyu 
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language), has an overtly populist political image and claims to be a membership 
organisation on a massive scale. One of the gangs’ roles is protection of their area 
and/or its leaders, who may sometimes be landlords, but that role may involve them in 
attacks on neighbouring locations. They also provide muscle for political leaders, and 
have played a part in the political struggle between government and opposition up to 
the election of an alternative government in 2002. Thus it is simplistic to see violent 
crime in Nairobi just as a set of isolated acts of criminality, or to try and deal with it 
solely as a law-and-order issue or in terms of policing. Nor are the patterns to be 
understood as the desperate acts of survival of excluded individuals or small groups: it 
is more organised, with links to politics and state institutions; it is couched in 
ideological terms to do with ‘evening up’ the inequalities and exclusion; and thrives 
in the context of corruption. 
 
In addition to the indirect involvement of individuals within government and politics, 
there has been a clear element of state violence in Kenya as a whole including 
Nairobi. In the 1990s the most dramatic examples of this in Kenya were the ‘ethnic 
clashes’ that preceded the elections in 1992 and 1997, which were widely believed to 
have been started by the previous regime. Less dramatic but systematic repression 
was familiar in the city. 
 
Small arms and light weapons in the context 
 
Arms have circulated in the city for 50 years, ever since the ‘Mau Mau’ rebellion 
against British colonial rule. They have become more widespread since 1990 as guns 
have circulated through the region from the war in Uganda in the 1980s and from 
Somalia in the 1990s. One survey (Stavrou, 2002) suggests about 10% of the urban 
population possess small arms – so they are common but not pervasive. However, 
guns are not the weapon of choice in the many acts of physical attack. The same 
survey brings out the extent of violent crime – 18% of residents had been victims at 
least once in the last year – but in only 14% of attacks on men and 8% on women 
were guns used; physical force or knives were more common. However, these figures 
relate just to crimes classified as ‘physical attacks on the person’. They understate the 
overall role of arms as a means of enforcement in such acts as car-jackings, road-
blocks, ‘tithes’ on buses, extortion, and in gang fights. 
 
Patterns of armed violence 
 
The widespread criminal violence and its increasing scale and impunity create a 
climate of fear. The Intermediate Technology Development Group survey (Stavrou, 
2002) recorded that 52% of all respondents said they worried about crime all the time 
and 35% did so sometimes. There was an overwhelming view that corruption is 
widespread and underpins the violence (96%). And the resulting attitude was one of a 
fatalism that nothing can be done. The new government that came to power in early 
2003 faces a major challenge in its efforts to change this perception. 
 
This case study argues that the patterns of criminal violence add up in large part to a 
set of struggles over contested space: between one slum area’s ‘defenders’ and those 
of a neighbouring location; between landlords’ enforcers and those of tenants; 
between one set of mini-bus operators and their rivals; between gang members and 
the homes and vehicles of the affluent. 
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Impacts of armed violence   
 
One dangerous area probed by surveys mounted as part of this Study suggests that 
about a quarter of the 10,000 matatu (mini-bus) vehicles can expect to be held up in 
any one year. It is estimated that there is a surcharge of about 25% to cover this risk – 
an expense that heightens the cost of commuting for the poor who rely on them. 
Estimates of the loss of valuables taken at gun-point are at $2m per year; an average 
loss of $40 each time it happens to poor people surviving on less than $1 per day. As 
well as putting up fares, operators invest in guards and enforcers, which further raises 
costs but also escalates the violence. Similar extra costs to the poor and escalations of 
armed violence occur in relation to other areas of contested space and other acts of 
armed violence: rent increases are enforced by thugs, protection has to be paid for, 
many people, especially women, are afraid to take the long, dangerous journeys from 
slum areas to places where work might be found. The bottom line is that the ‘bandit 
economy’ benefits a few but very much at the expense of the many of Nairobi’s poor. 
 
As well as the direct losses, the violent organised crime in Nairobi also affects the 
macro-economy, especially in two dimensions. Tourism, Kenya’s largest foreign 
exchange earner, is always very sensitive to fears of violence. In 1997 in the wake of 
major clashes in and around Mombasa, the centre of the coastal tourist industry, this 
event lead to a measurable reduction in the number of foreign tourists. There has also 
been a less clear-cut and more gradual loss due to Kenya’s and especially Nairobi’s 
image as an unsafe place. The same image seemed likely to affect one other aspect of 
Nairobi’s economy, when the UN system suggested downgrading Nairobi’s security 
rating in 2001. The city is host to by far the largest UN headquarters in Africa, even 
the international HQ of bodies such as the UN Environment Programme. If that were 
ever to happen there would be a dramatic impact on this presence that has a major 
multiplier effect on the Kenya economy. 
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Introduction 
 
Nairobi, Kenya’s capital city, suggested itself for investigation because it is marked 
by a high levels of crime, even compared with many other African metropolises. 
Moreover, there is a pattern where a high proportion of the crime is in fact violent: 
theft is not typically burglary but robbery; cars are not just stolen but increasingly 
hijacked. Even if not always armed robbery, use of weapons of some sort is 
commonplace. Unlike previous patterns of violent crime, the current wave seems to 
be characterized by a widespread feeling of impunity. Criminals do not simply 
deprive their victims of their valuables but seem intent on hurting them. People are 
robbed while in their homes and are harmed regardless of leaving witnesses. Evidence 
from surveys, some commissioned as part of the Safer Cities Programme of UN-
Habitat, worryingly indicates a degree of ‘social paralysis’ and acceptance in the face 
of the crime. 
 
Although emanating from the marginalized ‘informal’ settlements which house the 
most impoverished two thirds of the population, much of the violent crime is the work 
of organized groups linked to networks throughout the city and beyond, not simply 
individual responses of poor and marginalized people. Moreover, one vector of the 
violence has been conflict, sometimes amounting to small battles, between gangs and 
larger organisations contesting opportunities for gain that they control or seek to 
control. There is then both a ‘culture’ of violence and a political economy of violence, 
both of which have to be understood. 
 
1. The context of armed violence 
 
1.1 The underlying conflict dynamics 
 
Nairobi had already a reputation compared with other capitals in the region of a 
violent city marked by tension and crime. However, the degree of criminality and the 
increase in armed violence seemed to move up a gear during the 1990s. That decade 
created near revolutionary conditions that spawned atomisation and social exclusion 
in Kenya. Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) imposed by the international 
financial institutions (IFIs) engendered hikes in food prices, a decline in real wages 
and redundancies.  Reduced public expenditure in education spawned high school 
dropout rates of 200,000-300,000 a year by 2001, and many of these dropouts made 
the great trek from the rural into the urban frontier. There they constituted a pool of 
disaffected youth, open to recruitment by opposition parties and informally organised 
gangs and larger groups, seeking to take maximum advantage of the associational 
space that had opened up with the relaxation of laws allowing only a single party and 
external support to acquire political power. Together, they evolved a culture of 
political revolt that emerged in the early 1990s. 
 
Instead of spawning good governance, externally imposed political conditionalities 
laid the foundations for insecurities that would plague the state for more than a 
decade.  Conversely the consequences of economic liberalism were more ambiguous. 
It was not the nascent private sector that generated insecurity, but rather the regime 
that had the last word on who accessed expanding opportunities under privatisation 
(what I describe as SAP sites of accumulation) - this fact enhanced the regime’s 
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power. The regime responded to the situation accordingly, by minimizing the adverse 
effects of conditionalities, and maximising the favourable ones of liberalisation. 
 
Box 1: Life in Mtumba: a Nairobi slum 
 
The view from a mound of dirt and rubbish on the edge of Mtumba, a Nairobi nieghbourhood, 
is striking. To the South, acacia bushes dot the grass plains of Nairobi National Park as far as 
the eye can see; to the north lies the dense collection of one-story shacks that constitute 
Mtumba – 5-6 hectares where roughly 6,000 people crowd into 800 makeshift structures that 
are cobbled together with mud, wattle, plastic tarps and iron sheets.  Priced out of the 
“formal” real estate market, like 55 percent of Nairobi’s residents, the people of Mtumba have 
settled in “informal” housing – and this can be both cheered and despaired.  Many have 
fought hard to make it to Nairobi and surmount the daily challenges not only to survive but to 
improve their community.  If government worked properly, it would tap this human potential 
rather than squander it. 
 
On paper – in local maps and laws – the borders of the National Park’s 11,700 hectares are 
well defined, helping to protect the rhinos and giraffes that live there.  What does not show up 
on any map is Mtumba.  This means that its residents are endangered, receiving no protection 
from the law, Mtumba’s families have moved twice, landing in their current location in 1992, 
where they have had their homes completely demolished once and been threatened  with 
eviction several times.  “Every day we are waiting for the demolition squad”, says George 
Ng’ang’a.  “We are refugees in our own country”.  
 
Ng’ang’a, like others, came to Mtumba because it offered a respite from rural violence and a 
closer proximity to jobs.  He says his family’s land was taken by the colonial Kenyan 
government in 1952 to build a golf course.  “My father was a businessman”, he says, “so we 
went to different places, like nomads”.  Ng’ang’a continued the itinerant lifestyle, always 
looking for better opportunities for himself, his wife and their children.  “We came to the 
Nairobi slums, even though I have an education”. 
 
For several years in a row the people of Mtumba have chosen George Ng’ang’a to be the 
leader of the community’s governing council in informal elections.  Residents have elected a 
committee that has build a school, where four teachers juggle morning and afternoon shifts to 
teach more than 400 children.  On Sundays, community leaders convene committee meetings 
in the school, Mtumba’s sturdiest structure with a wood frame and corrugated metal walls and 
roof. 
 
Even with this concerted effort, Mtumba remains ineligible for basic urban services.  
Residents share three pit latrines and two water taps.  “It’s expensive”, says Tom Werunga of 
the water that private companies truck in and hook up to the taps.  “A family needs 100 litres 
per day for drinking and cleansing.”  This costs 25 Kenyan shillings, nearly half the earnings 
of someone who makes 50-60 shillings per day, as Werunga does.  Nairobi’s slum dwellers 
pay more than residents of wealthy housing estates for water – as a result, they use less than 
enough to meet health needs.  The under-five mortality rate is more than 151 per thousand 
births in Nairobi slums, far higher than the average for the city as a whole (61 per thousand) 
and 25 percent more than in rural Kenya (113 per thousand) 
 
Source:  Lawrence Apiyo et al, , (2000) State of the World , Special 20th Anniversary Edition (The 
Worldwatch Institute: New York). 
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The regime undertook minimum and constricted constitutional amendments.   
Although allowing multi-partyism and competitive elections in July 1992, it sought to 
retain control of the new electoral mechanisms when it passed a Bill which compelled 
prospective winning candidates to the presidency to garner at least 25% of the votes 
cast in five of the eight electoral provinces in addition to winning the overall popular 
vote (Katumanga, 1998: 31).  At the informal level, it resorted to the appropriation of 
private violence (violence organized by criminal social formations) and the 
privatisation of public violence (which sometimes involved privatising security agents 
before deploying them to serve illegal particularistic interests). The politically 
instigated ethnic violence that engulfed sections of the state in 1992 in the Rift Valley 
Province and in 1997 at the Coast should be seen in this perspective. The net effect 
was not only the narrowing of associational space as a consequence of fear, but also 
the containment of political groupings and identities opposed to the regime. 
 
What seemed constant was the drift into bad governance characterized by lack of 
accountability, trust and authority.  In 1997 the ruling elite of KANU had retained 
power with only 40% of the votes cast – as it had in 1992.  It did not believe it was 
accountable to anybody, feeling it could go on manipulating the votes. Instead of 
enhancing legitimate state penetration into society, an element critical to the evolution 
of social order, conflict management and resolution, the state was located at the centre 
of these conflicts. This crisis was exemplified in Nairobi, often caught between an 
ineffectual City Council and a corrupt and repressive state whose own security 
agencies were also ineffectual. 
 
2.2 The significance of small arms and light weapons 
 
Weapons began to circulate in Nairobi during the Mau Mau rebellion, the armed 
resistance that emerged from the nationalist movement, the Kenya African Union 
(KAU) later KANU, which began to emerge before World War 2. The government of 
Kenya, whose whites-only representatives then enjoyed a large degree of self-rule, 
with the support of the colonial government in Whitehall and British forces, declared 
a state of emergency between 1952-60. The uprising and the brutal repression against 
it (see Anderson’s and Elkins’ recent accounts, 2005) was chiefly focused on the 
Central Province, predominantly inhabited by Kikuyu people, but extended to Nairobi 
itself. The Kikuyu, then as now, were the largest single element in the ethnic make-up 
of the city, until large numbers were either sent to detention camps or systematically 
rusticated. But the city was and remained an organizational and communications hub 
for the clandestine movement, and was at the center of the web for distributing and 
making the captured and home-made guns and hand weapons which the rebels used. 
Both kinds of arms remained a part of life in the city after the Emergency and with the 
transition to Independence, achieved in 1963 – Nairobi was therefore already a city 
with a violent feel in the 1960s. Insecurity and high levels of crime continued to be 
features of the urban environment through the next decades. 
 
Some quantitative shift occurred in 1991-92 when a supply of guns came in to meet a 
ready market (Weiss, 2004: 6). Arms began to circulate through the region from the 
war in Uganda in the 1980s and increased with the militarisation of society in Somalia 
in the 1990s. The channels for this distribution are greased by the links with the 
Somali population who make up the main element in the population of Kenya’s North 
East Province and their large numbers in Nairobi itself. The suburb of Eastleigh is 
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regarded as one area where Somalis are congregated, and it is a busy market area 
where legal and illegal trade coexist and where both rich and poor shop; everything 
from cut-price fashions and appliances to illegal documents and guns are available.  
 
One ‘victimisation survey’ (Stavrou, 2002) suggests about 10% of the urban 
population now possess small arms (while 14% indicated they could get access if 
required) – they are thus common but not pervasive. However, guns are not the 
weapon of choice in the many acts of physical attack. The same survey brings out the 
extent of violent crime – 18% of residents had been victims at least once in the last 
year – but in only 14% of attacks on men and 8% on women were guns used; physical 
force or knives were more common. However, these figures relate just to crimes 
classified as ‘physical attacks on the person’. They understate the overall role of arms 
as a means of enforcement in such acts as car-jackings, road-blocks, ‘tithes’ on buses, 
extortion, and in gang fights. Thus 52% of those surveyed said they ‘regularly’ heard 
gunshots (more in the inner city than in the informal settlements); and two thirds 
thought that firearm possession was on the increase. 
 
3. The social and cultural context of armed violence 
 
3.1 The social and geographical context 
 
Decades after independence, Nairobi remains a differentiated city.  Unlike the simple 
citizen-subject racial dichotomy of the colonial period, in the 1990s the city was 
spatially divided not only in class terms but around both race and ethnic identities, 
especially among the urban poor who sometimes seemed to have merely relocated 
their villages into the city.  New entrants from rural areas continued to flood into the 
city, their numbers augmented by refugees from collapsed states in the region (some 
estates like Eastleigh and Komarock were literally taken over by Somali, Ethiopian 
and Rwandese refugees). All sought survival in any way possible, in a city without 
any pretence to planned amenities and where corruption and outright incompetence 
abounded. By 2003, new slums such as Soweto, Mukuru kwa Njenga and Maili 
Kayaba had emerged. Together they housed two thirds of Nairobi’s three million 
population.  The working class and lower middle class found themselves in Dandora, 
Githurai, Zimmerman, Umoja II, Kayole, Mathare North, Ngong’ and other 
neighbourhoods. 
 
City residents responded to poor governance, the lack of services and regime-led 
predation on public utility spaces in diverse ways. These ranged from exit to more 
direct forms of engagement. Middle class groups often organized themselves into self-
help networks that extracted additional ‘taxes’ from their members to pay for services 
such as security, garbage collection, street lights and road repairs which the local 
government no longer provided. In Karen-Langata, a ‘settler’ suburb (dominated by 
affluent whites), residents formed the Karen-Ngata Association  in a bid to shield 
themselves (through legal means) from what they perceived as taxation without 
services or representation. These differentiated petty bourgeois responses were 
informed by perceptions of costs and benefits likely to accrue from any action 
undertaken and their capacity to sustain the said action within the prevailing political 
context. 
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The urban lumpen element living in Nairobi’s slums opted for limited direct 
resistance against forced dislocation of their abodes through mass demolitions. Poorly 
organized, likely to have their lean-to dwelling raised to the ground in the night and 
generally overwhelmed by the naked violence of the State, their resistance tended to 
fizzle out as soon as it had begun. Unrestricted state violence led to many deaths as 
was the case during the Muoroto demolitions of informal settlements near the city 
centre in the early 1990s.  For most slum dwellers, direct resistance was a function of 
the fact that they had no fall-back position and everything to lose.  
 
In the end, this differentiation of response fragmented oppositional social forces while 
reinforcing the regime. Resistance failed to evolve into solidarity, greater political 
participation or effective pressure for good governance. An agenda for far-reaching 
reforms would have necessitated organizational initiatives led by a radicalized 
leadership, with an ideology and methods of engagement against the state such as 
seeking to gain control of the mainstream structures of governance. Instead, there was 
some limited voice through opposition political parties with their own agendas and 
interest in accumulation and clientelist politics. Thus economic liberalisation, regime 
deviance, and an ever-expanding urban population with its contradictory responses of 
cooption, withdrawal, defiance and resistance, converged in transforming urban 
engagements and modes of socio-economic reproduction and worked with the 
regime’s logic. The net effect was the decomposition and re-composition of social 
space. Two cases of engagement of these kinds of social forces are now addressed, 
both of which involve confrontation with the state, as the ruling elite was forced to 
liberalise, and did so by prioritising its own short-term survival to the detriment of the 
state as a viable entity. 
 
3.2 Conflict, cooperation and pavement spaces for economic production 
 
The defiance that characterized the 1990s had the outcome of eroding the probity and 
capacity of the City Commission to effect its by-laws.  Hordes of hawkers took 
advantage of this to conquer and occupy city alleyways, before subsequently 
descending on pavements running parallel to main streets such as Tom Mboya and 
Ronald Ngala Streets and Moi Avenue, in the process constricting movement.  By 
2002 there were around 10,000 hawkers on the streets of Nairobi.  This behaviour set 
in motion violent modes of production-based contestations. The first contestation 
pitted licensed (mainly Asian) traders against hawkers.  The second pitted the 
hawkers against the city commissioners seeking to eject them from the city.  The third 
pitted hawkers against regime-friendly beneficiaries of illegal land allocations. 
 
Yet there was also cooperation among these groups, rooted in their mutually 
reinforcing needs.  For instance hawkers who sold second-hand clothes and electronic 
goods were provisioned by some Asian businessmen and regime-friendly actors 
engaged in illegal importations of these same goods. Trade in counterfeit goods cost 
the state around Ksh 40 billion annually in the 1990s (see, “Counterfeits Cost 
Government Ksh 40b Annually”, The Financial Post, Issue no. 8, vol 8, 15 Nov. 
2004: p1). Women hawking vegetables, on the other hand, paid bribes to city askaris 
(local government police) in exchange for ‘permission’ to sell their fresh vegetables 
and fruits to city dwellers heading home from work.  
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Understanding their voting potential, the President would once in a while seek to 
intervene on behalf of these petty traders, promising to allocate spaces for them, only 
to reallocate the same to his political cronies when it suited him. In so doing, he was 
able to play off one group against another and in the process gain short-term 
advantage over his opponents.  The moment hawkers identified once again with the 
opposition, the regime would initiate ‘crack-downs’ resulting in violence and loss of 
property, pushing those with already meagre livelihoods into poverty.   
 
By 2002, hawkers had invaded Harambee Avenue (which houses the seat of 
Government). They eventually occupied Parliament road, the famous Kenyatta 
Avenue and Koinange Street. This effectively placed the central business district 
under their occupation.  By the time the Council was retaking its streets in 2003, a 
new crop of young merchants emerged from among the thousands of unemployed 
Kenyan college and school leavers.  These new entrants rode in on the appeal of 
cheap South East Asian products and successfully took over hundreds of spaces in the 
crime-infested central business district abandoned by Asian traders in preference for 
more secure new and burgeoning shopping malls. The post-KANU administration, 
which came to power in 2002, has so far failed to create job opportunities for high 
school or graduate youth, hence they continue to invade the commercial realm, 
creating precarious petty  ‘table shops’. This is a generational phenomenon, cutting 
across ethnicity. 
 
3.3 ‘Militia’ politics and the struggle for residential spaces 
 
Egged on by the sheer need to survive, thousands of marginalized youths in Nairobi 
drifted into gangs, militant formations under labels such as Talibans, Baghdad boys, 
Jeshi la Mzee, Jeshi la Embakasi and Mungiki1.  These groups could be hired by 
politicians for around Ksh 250 (US$4) a time to unleash violence on their opponents.  
Some provided vigilante security in working class estates.  What was notable about 
the operations of these groups was their mobilisation around ethnic identities within 
which class difference was obscured. Politicians sought to borrow their violence by 
playing down their own class interests and instead appealing to common ethnic 
identities. Such militias operating in Nairobi included Jeshi la Mzee (The Elder’s 
Battalion), who were used to beat up civil society activists such as the Rev. Timothy 
Njoya, and Jeshi la Embakasi (The Embakasi Battalion), an amorphous group that 
appears in land disputes in Nairobi with the most notable incident being an invasion 
of the 818-acre piece of land that sits between Umoja II, Kayole and Komarock 
Estates in Nairobi. 
 
Underlying these formations in some cases are the ownership and habitation of spaces 
in lower class settlements. For instance, in a settlement like Kibera, with a population 
of more than 700,000, houses are mainly owned by Nubians and Kikuyu, yet the 
majority of the tenants are Luo, Luhya and Kamba – reflecting the history and 
character of different waves of migration into Nairobi from regions unequally 
developed. Not all neighbourhoods have such clear ethnic distinctions, the extent of 
mobilisation of ‘ethnicity’ depends on composition of an area, but also on the 
                                                 
1 As indicated by the names, these youth find inspiration from certain international actors. In specific terms, these 
names are ideological indicating admiration for defiance, revolt and the use of any means to wrestle certain 
contested values from the powerful.  
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opportunism in a clear strategy to access modes of accumulation (see Section 4 
below).   
 
In Kibera, it was not long before conflicts emerged consequent to attempts by the 
regime to construct a new power base following a national alliance between KANU 
and the National Democratic Party (NDP).  In a local ‘Harambee’ meeting (aimed at 
engaging with the public through exhortation and fundraising) held in Kibera on the 
31st October 2001 and presided over by the then President, Daniel arap Moi, the 
District Commissioner was instructed to have local rents reduced by 50% (Daily 
Nation, November 1st 200), a decision which met stiff resistance from private 
landlords. The landlords were then set upon by the Talibans - a predominantly Luo 
militia. Armed with whips, stones, rungus (knobkerries) and machetes, the Talibans 
invaded Kibera (Daily Nation, 6th March 2002, p2). By the time the violence was 
contained, perhaps as many as 15 had lost their lives, women had been raped and 
property destroyed (The People, 27th November 2001). 
 
Kariobangi (another sprawling informal settlement) was ‘ruled’ by Mungiki, a 
millenarian group that derived its name from the word muingi, meaning masses in 
Kikuyu. Ideologically it appeals to the marginalised of Kenyan society, even ‘the 
public’ at large (see John Githongo, “Why won’t the State Clip them Dreadlocks”, 
East African, 15 November 2000, and Servant, 2005). Mungiki is described in these 
terms by Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Wangari Maathai: 
… the disinherited, the ones who have been refused everything. The schools have 
rejected them for want of space and they haven’t found work. As far as they can 
see, they’re excluded from everything simply for being ethnic Kikuyu (quoted in 
Servant, 2005). 
 
Mungiki advocates a return to cultural values, the right to learn indigenous traditions 
and opposition to imperialist control of Kenya’s economy.  Its spread in the 1990s can 
be attributed to thousands of Kikuyu uprooted from where they had been resettled in 
the 1960s in parts of the Rift Valley such as Ole Nguruone, Elburgon, Subukia, 
Laikipia and Nyahururu, following widespread clashes in an area originally 
dominated by other groups and in colonial times by settler farmers. It began its career 
in opposition to the regime, and its initial livelihood was in the provision of security 
in working and lower middle class estates such as Kariobangi North, Kahawa West 
and Dandora (Daily Nation, 3rd April 2001). 
 
In the mid 1990s, Mungiki’s leaders claimed to have an enrolled membership of 
between 3.5 million to 4 million people, with branches across the republic.  With each 
member paying Ksh 3 per month, it claimed the capacity to raise as much as Ksh 4.5 
million per month (US$58,000) in subscriptions.  In March 2002, Mungiki murdered 
23 people and injured 31 others in the sprawling slums in Kariobangi North when five 
hundred of them took revenge on the Taliban for the murder of two of their members. 
 
To the extent that Mungiki was perceived to be aligned to the opposition, it was often 
confronted by state security.  But by late 2002, the regime’s relation with Mungiki 
was transformed from one of confrontation to overt tolerance of its threats to public 
order.  This change was apparently informed by their decision to back the regime’s 
new presidential candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta.  Subsequently they were allowed to take 
over certain transport routes (a fact that allowed them to raise cash which they used to 
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pay their adherents), hold public processions and threaten opposition opponents with 
impunity. 
 
4. The political economy of violence  
 
4.1  National politics and corruption 
 
The linkages between violent criminality stretch from the national level, which 
provides the context for all the more localised violence. Under this overall system of 
bandit economics of corruption, those who became agents of the regime were 
rewarded according to their class status.  Large and would-be capitalists with political 
links were facilitated in entrepreneuring bandit companies through which funds were 
ferreted from the Central Bank. Core to this was the Goldenberg scandal in which 
more than Ksh 60 billion (US$769.2 million) was siphoned out of the Central Bank 
on false pretences.  Ksh 4.5 billion (approx. US$57.7 million) of this cash was used to 
buy political support for the then ruling party KANU in the forthcoming election in 
19921.  By 2003, politicians and senior civil servants had set up their own modes of 
extraction from companies seeking to do business in Kenya. It is alleged that a 
contract worth Ksh 100 million would cost companies Ksh 7.5 million in bribes.  In 
printing and publishing, companies were forced to part with an average of 11.5% of 
the total contract sum, in textiles, garments and furniture 8.9%, and in the metal sector 
8.8% (Kimuyu, 2004). 
 
In an attempt to detach urban criminalised youth from their 1992 alliances with the 
opposition, rewards were found, ranging from cash payments to the securing of access 
to spaces of socio-economic reproduction. Distribution of patronage to new economic 
‘entrepreneurs’ was a tactic promoting the long-term regime consolidation strategy, 
but in this case the existential ‘illegality’ of urban lumpen elements, their precarious 
existence in informal habitations and livelihoods, could be manipulated to motivate 
them into compliance.  If necessary their economic reproduction sites or informal 
habitations could be destroyed or appropriated for politically compliant individuals 
who would then be free to dispose of their assets.   
 
Following violent eviction of previous tenants, the new owners would subsequently 
resell, sometimes to parastatals such as the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) or 
National Hospital Insurance Fund at a mere song.  NSSF is said to have allocated Ksh  
30 billion (US$384.6 million) over five years for acquisition of such plots.  
Conversely, in a bid to blunt opposition to the regime, allocations of public land were 
granted to religious organizations, politicians, civil servants and foreign embassies, 
including the Catholic, Anglican, African Inland Church, East Africa Presbyterian, 
Seventh Day Adventists, Full Gospel, Pentecostal Independent Church of Africa, 
Pentecostal Assemblies, Holy Trinity, (see “Churches and MPs named in Land 
Deals”, Daily Nation, 8 October 2004 p1, p 4). Kenya Airports Authority for instance, 
lost as much as 972.36 hectares of land dished out to private developers who later set 
up illegal structures on flight paths posing a danger to aviation.2  The fact that the 
                                                 
2 Alottees included Manchester Outfitters Limited, Mechanized Cargo Systems, Kenya Airways, Mumbu Holdings 
Ltd, Dehasa Investments, NAS Airport Services, Signon Cargo Center, African Airlines, Kejpa Motors, 
Homegrown Kenya Limited, Skybird Executive Safaris, Pinnacle Development Limited, Oserian Development Co. 
Ltd, Ramco Investments, Uchumi Supermarkets, Makindu Growers and Packers Ltd, Markfirst Kenya Ltd,”,  See, 
“How State Firms Lost billions in Bogus Bills”,  The Standard, 12 November 2004, p1. 
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ruling elite used the State to undertake this process, deciding who stayed or left, 
enhanced its powers.  It became the major source of potential accumulation.  
 
Patronage also saw crafty ‘entrepreneurs’ sell off parastatal land to unsuspecting 
members of the aspiring middle class in most cases after being allocated the same by 
the Head of State.   One classic example is the allocation of land belonging to the 
NSSF in Embakasi and along Outering Road (LR21189, 21190 and Block 97 
respectively). Instead of paying Ksh 900,000 (its actual value) the buyers paid a mere 
Ksh 200,000 before subsequently constructing bungalows worth Ksh 3million. NSSF 
is demanding the actual cost before issuing titles to 300 of such owners. It has 
threatened them with demolition (The Standard, 2nd November 2004, p1). 
Patronage might also mean access to other sites of accumulation, including drug 
trafficking, or licences for illegal importation of contraband goods from South East 
Asia. The diminishing capacity of law and order institutions (see section 4.3, p17) had 
the effect of spawning other urban forms of predation such as motor vehicle theft and 
hijackings. The rise in crime is often understood in terms of the ‘deviant sub-culture’ 
thesis, which attributes poverty and deviance to individual failure, whereas the 1990s 
deviance in Kenya was state encouraged for politico-economic ends. Some examples 
of the more localised forms of this corrupt and contested terrain are offered in the next 
sub-sections. 
4.2  Transport spaces  
 
Transport spaces stand out as some of the most contested realms in Kenya.  
Contestations revolve around the matatus – cheap private minibuses and cabs 
competitively plying for business (from the Swahili tatu for three reflecting the fare in 
the early days of three cents). An informal transport system, the matatu industry was 
estimated in 1993 to employ 80,000 people directly countrywide, and an equivalent 
number indirectly. Its activities were said to earn the economy an estimated Ksh 60 
billion, with Ksh 1.9 billion reaped in taxes (Economic Survey, 1993). 
 
Liberalisation of the Kenyan economy in the 1990s animated not only growth in this 
industry but also struggles for control. Two factors underlay its growth; the relaxation 
on the import of second hand cars (mainly Urvan Nissans and Toyotas) which were 
immediately converted into matatus, and the importation of vehicle chassis which 
enabled faster assembly of minibuses, christened manyangas. The availability of these 
vehicles expanded sites of accumulation for owners, and jobs as drivers, touts, 
conductors, or mechanics for thousands of unemployed urban lumpen elements 
hardened by opposition politics. There were vehicles owners who expected to receive 
up to Ksh 7,000 a day from the touts who operated their matatus in the 1990s.  On 
their part, drivers and touts took home an average of Ksh 1,500 per day (see Ken 
Opala and Caxton Muune, “The Battle over Matatu Control”, Daily Nation, 17th July 
1996). There was also protection money, extorted by poorly remunerated and highly 
demoralised police officers (some of whom also entered the industry as vehicle 
owners), from both the owners and the touts lest they were arrested for all sorts of 
frivolous reasons.  The involvement of some police officers as both owners and 
extortionists seemed to encourage the bandit logic among touts, providing a visa for 
violence and disregard for the law.   
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There was cut-throat competition, even wars fought over routes and terminal points 
among these new petty capitalists. Nairobi alone has a total of 100 matatu routes. 
Cartels emerged to launch a booming business by setting high entry barriers to the 
routes they controlled. Vehicle owners paid an average of Ksh 20,000-50,000 
(depending on potential return) to have their vehicles ply certain routes, as well as an 
average Ksh 300 per day to various route-manning cartels. They also paid parking 
fees of Ksh 250 to the city commission. There was Ksh 20 to be paid by the owner 
every time the vehicle left a given estate with passengers (see Ochieng’ Ogodo, “And 
now welcome into the Matatu industry”, East African Standard, 21st February, 2003: 
p 13). 
 
Enlivening the matatu subculture was blaring hip-hop music played with impunity in 
these vehicles, transforming them into moving discos in total disregard of the tastes of 
their clients. Clad in baggy trousers and American baseball caps, the khat-chewing 
matatu touts were easily identified by their foul language, disregard for passenger 
safety and rudeness towards their clients.  They would arbitrarily raise the fares or 
stop the vehicles in the middle of roads in total contempt of traffic rules and 
regulations.   
 
By the mid-1990s, vigilante groups like Mungiki and Kamjeshi entered the fray. 
Given the returns inherent in the matatu industry, here were profits which could be 
converted with ease to finance the tools of violence. The control of matatu routes 
became a battle ground as Mungiki and Kamjeshi began fighting for physical 
occupation of the routes and termini: “between July and September 2001 about 15 
people were hacked to death consequent to engagements between Mungiki and 
Kamjeshi gangs over control of Dandora route” (Daily Nation, 20th February 2002). 
 
Box 2: Violence in transport conflict – by thugs and the state 
 
On the 6th June 2002, before midday, plain-clothes police officers shot and killed four 
thugs who had commandeered and attempted to rob passengers in a matatu plying 
route no. 16.  The thugs who had boarded the vehicle around about high-rise estate 
had attempted to divert the city-bound matatu to Ngong’ when they were shot by the 
police near the Mbagathi way mosque. Demonstrations held by matatu drivers and 
conductors in May 2002 points to the concerns of the transport industry over this 
issue. Touts interviewed on a local TV station, observed that all matatu routes in 
Nairobi suffers an average of at least three car-jackings every three nights 
 
  
By November 2001, Mungiki had taken over the Kayole, Babadogo and Kikuyu 
routes while the Transport Licensing Board sat on the fence and failed to support the 
Matatu Welfare Association’s (MWA) demand that they keep out. The Government 
in most cases remained a bystander as these pro-opposition groups fought for 
supremacy, the police seemingly unable to contain their activities (“The Matatu 
Industry: The Big Issue”, East Africa Standard, 5 November 2001: p 3). The logic 
that underlay violence in the industry was that the regime was exercising options by 
deciding whom to please or displease.  To the extent that the violence involved 
opposition-linked groups, it was disinclined to intercede.  Yet it would selectively 
rush to intervene when the conflict threatened the interests of regime-friendly 
interests.  
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Later the inability of the Government to demonstrate its monopoly over violence for 
the common good saw Mungiki take over the lucrative route 32 serving the sprawling 
Dandora and Mathare North slums, as well as the Komarock and Umoja routes (East 
African Standard, November 2001).  In total, they successfully took over 15 out of 
100 routes in Nairobi.  This coincided with their new modes of collaboration with the 
regime in late 2002. It was not until 2004 that a serious attempt was made by the new 
NARC government (which came to power at the 2002 election) to bring order in the 
transport sector. This entailed the imposition of new rules that limited the numbers of 
passengers that could be ferried by vehicles and the compulsory fitting of seat belts. 
They also attempted to remove the self-imposed stage managers.   After a brief 
resistance by various gangs, the rules were operationalized.  (Mungiki went 
underground, only to re-emerge in January and February of 2003 with the killing of 
several people in Nakuru and security officers in Nairobi’s Dandora area). 
  
4.3  ‘Lumpen’ banditry 
 
The 1990s saw increased forms of banditry with roots among urban lumpen elements, 
and with transport as their main realm of predation. Their audacious behaviour was 
shadowed by the diminishing institutional capacity of the police force. Constraints on 
government recurrent expenditure imposed by the IMF and the World Bank had the 
net effect of freezing not only salaries of security forces but also their complements. 
By 1996, there were 30,000 police officers compared to a population of about 30 
million, translating into a 1:1,000 ratio or one police office for every 1,000 Kenyans.  
By 2002 it had grown to 1:1400.  Worse still, the security forces suffered from lack of 
infrastructure and institutional capacity, poor leadership and corruption in 
recruitment, promotion and operational matters. Poor pay combined with favouritism 
to engender demoralisation and lethargy in the force. This was reflected in the 
absence of adequate supervision with respect to gun handling, to the extent that some 
began hiring out their guns to others for robbery and other criminal activities.  
 
In the late 1990s the state created the National Intelligence Service.  The core of this 
service was recruited from the best cells of the police force.  Little effort was made to 
retrain and improve the welfare of those who remained.  Young graduate recruits to 
the police force ended up frustrated due to poor pay and lack of promotion 
opportunities. As the frontiers for primitive accumulation increased, the security 
forces jumped on the bandwagon. Many doubled up in extorting bribes and 
collaborating with bandits. Special units created to combat crime became a source of 
the same. Some police officers went to the extent of leaking operational plans (see the 
latest case in Hudson Gumbihi, “Officer under probe for ‘assisting’ thugs”, The 
People Daily, 13 October 2004: p18). Before long, security frameworks become 
fragile, lacking effectiveness and legitimacy. It was as if state institutions were 
engaged in what Crawford Young calls ‘self-cannibalization’. Citizens experienced 
state rule as simple predation instead of protection.  
 
5. The impact on poverty 
 
5.1 Loss of assets 
 
The UN-Habitat/Intermediate Technology Group East Africa survey (ITDG, 2001) 
carried out in March-June 2001 indicated that 40% of Nairobians had been victims of 
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robberies, and 22% had been victims of theft at least once in 2000. 18% claimed to 
have been physically assaulted. Most respondents intimated that they had been 
victims in broad daylight. 
 
Overall, increases in these and other crimes have the net effect of creating a siege 
mentality that has seen Kenyans leave their places of work very early, in the process 
generating heavy traffic jams which in turn engender the loss of productive time. 
Most are afraid of accessing money dispensing machines for fear of being attacked 
 
By 2004, the very survival of urban economic activities had come under serious threat 
from lumpen banditry, exacerbated by the collapsing formal economy and the influx 
of small arms. The direct cost of this bandit economy can be indicated by estimating 
the loss of assets. For instance, one of the more recent developments has been the 
hijacking of public vehicles and robbery of their passengers, including matatus. 
Drivers have been shot, conductors and passengers robbed of their money, cell phones 
and other personal effects. In some extreme cases passengers and drivers have been 
robbed, assaulted and stripped naked.  Women have also been subjected to rape 
ordeals (according to interviews with Senior Security and Administrative Officers 
engaged in urban anti-bandit operations). 
 
In a survey of incidents of matatu highway thefts carried out in Nairobi and its 
suburbs between the 7th and 19th June 2004 for this study3, it was found that out of 
181 respondents on nine out of 24 major routes surveyed, 46 people or 25.5% 
confirmed having experienced hold-ups of the vehicles on which they were travelling 
at least once during the year.  Route 30 (Kinoo, Westlands, Uthiru) registered the 
highest proportion of hijacking incidents. A few had experienced the hijacking and 
driving off of the matatu. Routes with high rates of hold-up tend to have certain 
characteristics.  These include high density of population and the availability of 
accessible escape routes for thugs. These routes are also characterised by poorly lit 
picking-up points from which thugs can access the vehicles.   
 
A total of Ksh 576,350 (US$7,389) in cash and 398 mobile phones valued at Ksh 
1,173,000 (US$15,038) were reported as expropriated at gunpoint in these hold-ups.  
The total value of personal assets stolen in the course of the 46 reported incidents of 
carjacking thus amounted to Ksh 2,168,350 (US$27,799.4). The average value of 
stolen assets per incident of hijacking translates to roughly Ksh 47,000. If it is 
estimated that the number of matatu vehicles in Nairobi is of the order of 10,000, 
extrapolation suggests that the number of hijacked vehicles at 25.5% would be about 
2,500 matatus annually. The immediate loss to passengers from this one kind of 
violent activity (losses would be much greater if hold-ups of private vehicles were 
included), thus translates to the equivalent to US$6million per year predominantly 
from Kenyans of lesser means who rely on public transport. The money is equivalent 
to the total school tuition fees of an average 750 secondary school students attending 
for one year. Those operating in this highway robbery, basically young unemployed, 
                                                 
3 The data in this section is extracted from findings of a survey undertaken on a cross-section of routes in Nairobi,. 
Specifically for the AVPI Study.  The routes surveyed included Numbers 9/6 (Eastleigh, Pangani, Ngara),32/42 
(Dandora), 33/34 (Embakasi, Tena, Donholm, Pipeline), 30 (Westlands, Kangemi, Kinoo), 19/61 (Komarock, 
Kayole),125/126 (Ongata Rongai, Kiserian), 46/56(Kawangware), 105/115 (Kikuyu, Limuru), 111 (Ngong, Karen) 
points to the intensity and nature of this mode of banditism. Only 15% or a total of 817 vehicles mainly 
Toyotas/Nissans and Mini-Buses were sampled 
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of course reap the returns, which are far greater than what they would get if lucky 
enough to be in employment.   
 
On average, poor Kenyans live on less than a dollar per day. These poor also end up 
paying more for goods and services due to the increased costs of living engendered by 
thuggery. Again evidence from the matatu traffic is illustrative of the premiums they 
pay. For instance, on Routes 32/42 (Dandora), and 19/61 (Kayole, Komarock) 
matatus tend to hike their fares by 25% from 8.00pm at night as a premium for the 
risk to owners and franchisees of matatus. In a bid to respond to highway banditry, 
matatu proprietors have had to purchase security screening gadgets.   Those without 
them often drive their vehicles to police stations for body searches.  Most matatus 
now avoid picking up passengers en route at night.  The net effect of all this is loss in 
earnings, anxiety and panicky exits from Nairobi that continue to impact negatively 
on the formal economy. The effects of highway robbery continue to marginalise the 
already disadvantaged poor. Given this state of affairs, and the dangers of matatu 
transport, many are forced to trek long distances on foot to work. Many others just 
give up on seeking work in parts of the city too far to walk and too dangerous or 
expensive to reach by matatu. 
 
In a bid to combat this mode of banditry, the new police commissioner, General 
Hussein Ali, has set up new police units such as Spiders who operate from Police 
matatus (which are also expected to deal with rapists) and diplomatic corps whose 
detail is the protection of diplomats.  There has also been an increase in the number of 
road-blocks and motor vehicle inspections aimed at flushing out gun-carrying bandits.    
 
In addition, Nairobi has been experiencing high levels of predation on personal 
vehicles. Here, of course, it is the better-off who are being targeted. While urban 
lumpen youth are again at the core of this type of urban banditry, they are here 
basically puppets of organized syndicates that make the one-man ‘jobs’ of the 1980s 
pale into insignificance. While the latter were basically focused on the city centre, the 
current predatory activities are well organised to serve regional bandit markets. The 
godfathers seem to be individuals involved in ‘respectable’ businesses that act as 
fronts to camouflage their real activities. Those involved are alleged to include 
renowned industrialists and businessmen (according to interviews with senior security 
and administrative officers involved in urban anti-bandit operations). 
  
In the early 1980s it was only parked vehicles that were stolen; now this has extended 
to those being driven. Like the matatu banditry this mode is also characterized by 
high levels of impunity that have seen motorists killed who even slightly hesitate to 
hand over their vehicles. During the four year period from 2000 to 2004 the scale and 
value of this trade have increased dramatically. In 2000, an estimated 528 cars were 
stolen; in addition 1,775 cars were robbed (i.e. car-jacked). In total there were 2,300 
stolen or robbed in the year 2000 - 6.4 cars per day.  Of the total of 2,300 vehicles 
stolen/robbed, only 693 cars were recovered; representing an average recovery rate of 
30%. In 2001, a total of 2,375 cars were stolen/robbed.  Of these, 1,025 were 
recovered representing a recovery rate of 43.2%. In the year 2002, 942 cars were 
stolen, another 2,196 were carjacked, making a total of 3,138; 1,633 cars were 
recovered.  The recovery rate for the same period was 52%. In 2003 a total of 759 and 
2196 cars were stolen and carjacked respectively. These added up to 2955.  51% 
(1534) were recovered. 
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It is estimated that about 50% of these stolen vehicles found their way through a well 
coordinated syndicate into neighbouring States - Uganda, Tanzania, DRC and to a 
lesser extent Rwanda, Burundi, Zambia and Malawi. Perhaps another 40% of the cars 
were cannibalised for second hand spare parts. The remaining 10% of the cars had 
their colour, number plates, chassis number altered and were then resold in the local 
black market. 
 
In the first five months of 2004, 270 vehicles had been recorded stolen, another 857 
cars jacked/robbed - a total of 1127, which proportionately would suggest projections 
of 2705 for the whole year. The law enforcement agencies had a recovery rate of 
45.5%. The total for the five-year period 2000-2004 figures would thus be of the order 
of 12,000 vehicles stolen/robbed. The total value would be of the order of $60,000 – 
although not all of this would be a net loss to the economy, or government revenues. 
 
According to press reports, 90% of the vehicles recovered in 2004 had been used by 
criminals as get-away cars. Musa Yego of the special Crimes Prevention Unit noted 
that 70% of incidents occurred in upper class ‘low-density’ estates in Nairobi.  The 
level of sophistication of the process is discernible by the tactics deployed.  
Reconnaissance is undertaken on the victims and ambush spots.  The most popular 
points are black spots: busy roundabouts, T-junctions, pothole points, feeder roads 
and gates. All carjacking incidents occur with the use of guns. Each gang of 
carjackers steals an average of one car each day. According to the same police reports 
about 75% of vehicles stolen or robbed were taken at gun point, i.e. about 8,000 of the 
vehicles taken in the last five years. To sustain the rate of car-jackings there would 
have to be between 50 to 100 armed gangs, bearing in mind that it takes one day to 
plan and steal a vehicle, another day to either dismantle it prior to selling the spare 
parts or arranging to have new but fake papers, new number plates and the change of 
colour needed to drive the car across the border. Reports from victims suggest that 
there are typically three or more guns in each gang. 
 
5.2 Impact on the macro-economy 
 
Nairobi remains a city under constant decomposition and recomposition, 
characterized by vicious struggles over living spaces. The exclusivist logic of the 
formal political economy ensures that thousands in the slums (especially hawkers and 
self-employed artisans, unemployed youth and women) remain marginalised. The 
informal economy, including the urban banditry, may explain the survival of Kenya 
despite aid embargoes from IFIs and the massive disinvestment manifested in poor 
physical and communication infrastructure and diminished institutional capacity to 
guarantee law and order – although violent crime is one explanation of the 
disinvestments. 
 
Thus, one measure of the macro-economic impact of this climate of marginality and 
insecurity is capital flight. Between 1999 and 2002, a total of 140 foreign investors 
pulled out, citing corruption, poor infrastructure, bureaucratic bottlenecks and 
increased crime rate. Direct foreign investment dropped from Ksh 26 billion to Ksh 
22 billion between 1996 and 1998. It has been estimated (Ngunyi, 1999) that the 
bandit economy averaged Ksh 1.5 billion (US$19.2 million) and Ksh 6.2 billion (US$ 
79.5 million) annually for vehicle theft and hijacking and predation on forests 
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respectively between 1990 and 1998, whilst government corruption averaged Ksh 
127.4 billion between 1990 and 1999 (see Ngunyi, 1999: p21). 
 
The Kenyan regime literally sustained a bandit economy that ran parallel to the weak 
formal economy. Conversely there are some key beneficiaries of the crime rates such 
as the owners of security firms. The top 20 security companies earned Ksh 20 billion 
(US$250m) in 1999.  A conservative estimate of a 10% increase would put their 
earnings at Ksh 32 billion (US$400m today). More of these firms continue to 
mushroom, whilst security guards are among the most poorly paid and hardly earn 
enough to send their children to school. 
 
Coupled with an increasing sense of insecurity at the personal level, Kenya’s 
economic recovery and by inference people’s standards of living will continue to be 
undermined.  Local industrialists and multinational corporations represented in the 
Eastern African Association (with 140 member companies, East African 10-16 Oct., 
2002) point to crime as their second main concern after poor telecommunication 
infrastructure. Of the 100 companies sampled in the EAA’s own survey, insecurity 
scored 87.8% compared to communication at 90%. 
 
The widespread perception of insecurity as a result of the violent organised crime in 
Nairobi also affects the macro-economy in two other dimensions. Tourism, Kenya’s 
largest foreign exchange earner, is always very sensitive to fears of violence. After 
some decline in the early 1990s, in 1997 in the wake of major clashes in and around 
Mombasa, centre of the coastal tourist industry, this event lead to a further measurable 
reduction in the number of foreign tourists. There was also a less clear-cut and more 
gradual loss due to Kenya’s and especially Nairobi’s image as an unsafe place. The 
US Government issued an official ‘advisory’, warning travellers not to visit Kenya, 
and British Airways stopped flights. By the late 1990s tourist numbers (in 2000 it had 
fallen to half of the 900,000 recorded in the late 1980s) and revenues had fallen and 
the tourist industry faced crisis. Since then there has been a partial recovery and 
tourist numbers finally began to rise again from 2003 after the election of the new 
government, and the US downgraded its advisory merely to warning travellers to be 
careful when visiting Kenya. 
 
The same threatening image seemed likely to affect one other aspect of Nairobi’s 
economy, when the UN system mooted a downgrading of Nairobi’s security rating in 
2001. The city is host to by far the largest UN complex in Africa, even of the 
international headquarters of bodies such as the UN Environment Programme and UN 
Habitat. Associated with the UN facilities, a large number of diplomatic and 
development aid agencies, and of NGOs, some concerned with the many 
neighbouring conflict countries, are represented and have larger than average 
personnel there. One 2002 estimate suggested that there were 20,000 expatriates in the 
city (quoted in Servant, 2005), most of them earning and (at least in part) spending 
high salaries. If such a down-grading were to happen there would be a dramatic 
impact on this presence that would have a major multiplier effect on the Kenya 
economy.  
 
The climate of insecurity also imposes extra costs on a range of business activities. 
People’s fears about accessing cash machines has led to plans by the Kenya Bankers’ 
Association to install closed circuit surveillance cameras along Nairobi’s main streets.   
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Shopping complexes in Nairobi such as the Village Market and Sarit Centre have also 
invested heavily in security. Village Market spends an average of Ksh 500,000 
(US$6,250) per month on 24-hour patrols and security gadgets.  Alongside this are 
insurance premiums which have also increased by between 5 to 10% annually.  Sarit 
Centre incurs a security bill of Ksh 800,000 (US$10,000) per month.  The cost of 
hiring regular police patrols have also gone up from Ksh 200 (US$2.5) to Ksh 1,000 
(US$12.5) per day.  More critical is the increasing despondency amongst business 
elements that the state cannot guarantee their rights to property, a factor that 
constrains commitment to hard work and encourages the drift towards informal 
economies as the cheap way out of an increasingly marginalised formal economy. 
Informalisation is boosted every time customers purchase cheap goods which are 
probably stolen.  Conversely the criminals operate with an increasing sense of 
impunity.  
 
6. Recommendations 
 
To extricate the city from the morass in which it finds itself, there are two 
fundamental requirements:  
• To re-establish an effective governance realm within the country as a whole and 
in Nairobi in particular.   
• To promote a poverty-reducing development path that will, in particular provide 
gainful livelihoods for young people. 
  
Promotion of these basic goals will be a challenging task, demanding the reversal of 
policies and patterns of the last decades, among a broad range of initiatives specific 
priorities should include:  
 
6.1 On governance 
 
• Corruption is perceived as a major root cause of violence – a massive 96% of the 
ITDG Survey (Stavrou, 2002: 40) claimed that corruption was endemic in Kenyan 
society. And, in the same survey, the suggested government action to make 
Nairobi a safer place that was cited most frequently was tackling corruption. 
Unfortunately, after promising initial signs, the new government has not made 
major in-roads into the problem since 2002. The commissioner appointed to 
spearhead anti-corruption resigned from government in 2005, and the UK High 
Commissioner made sharp public criticisms of performance during 2004. 
• A Constitutional Review is a task crucial to a range of specific reforms in 
procedures and capacities, including the possibility of redefining local government 
and its responsibilities and relations with central government – badly needed to 
deal with the ineffectiveness of governance and the provision of security in 
Nairobi. However, this process, which began under the old regime is still stalled in 
Kenya. 
• Land reform is another essential item on Kenya’s agenda of reform, which is the 
subject of a process just beginning which would allow some participation. 
Tackling the issue nationally can contribute to poverty reduction, especially to the 
landlessness that drives young people to town, but there are also issues 
surrounding land rights in the city. Granting secure title to slum dwellers in the 
areas they currently occupy will give them security of tenure and enable them to 
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access credit in banks and to transform their existing dead capital into productive 
capital total integrated in the formal economy. 
 
6.2 On poverty-reducing development 
 
• With an estimated Ksh 300 billion (US$3.75 billion) stashed outside the state by 
former power wielders4, Kenya needs to appeal to her development partners to 
help her recover the same which would make possible a range of measures, and 
the operationalisation of a development state.  
• An adequate strategy is seen as requiring more than just increased capacity – there 
are calls for a developmental state to grapple with questions of access to means of 
production and enhanced state penetration in the society. 
• The increasing rate of crime will not be contained without a concerted attempt to 
resolve the crisis of more than four million young Kenyans ejected out of the 
formal system by the IMF-World Bank driven logic of a minimalist state.  A 
specific measure would be for a national youth service under the military which 
can help build infrastructure, housing units and schools, and in the process 
enhance skills; or some other form of public works provision to absorb them is 
needed. Alternatively, opportunities to return to school would be another solution.  
 
6.3 On gun crime 
 
• Other concrete measures could include those to reduce the small arms in 
circulation and also to promote an alternative to the gun culture that attracts young 
men. Further support should be given to a number of initiatives at local level such 
as the Kasarani Starehe Youth (KASTA), which began to broker a peace between 
youth in the two neighbourhoods in the title of their organisation, and the Nairobi 
Youth Network for Peace (NYNP) which is an umbrella body to which KASTA 
and other groups belong. 
 
                                                 
4 See, for instance, “Found: Sh. 75 billion Stashed Abroad by KANU Looters”, Daily Nation, 17 December, 2003: 
p1. 
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